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We all do it: even the best of us overread opinions. From the first weeks of
law school, iterated and reiterated through our professional lives, we have
heard and understood that the opinion of an appellate court is to be read in its
own fact context; but we remember a ringing phrase longer than we remember
its factual setting. And so we respond to the opinion author's exhortation and
hyperbole. Who can forget "neither black schools nor white schools, just
schools,"' or "the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school
systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools, ' 2 or
"[flurther delays will not be tolerated in this circuit."'3 But how many of us
remember that the first phrase was written in a rural fact setting presenting
none of the insoluble integration problems encountered in the cities, and that
the second and third were directed toward recalcitrant school boards that had
stubbornly set their face against compliance with new constitutional doctrine?
The author of such inspirational rubric is sometimes astonished at overcom-
pliance by those who read it out of context.
John Mull never tired of telling me in my first ten years of law practice to
"salt down the facts."4 Facts are the premises of a syllogism to invoke a legal
doctrine. I once knew another distinguished lawyer whose respect for the facts
was so great that he commonly drew the judgment he sought before drafting
his complaint to make sure he pleaded enough facts. Implicit in the Supreme
Court's doctrine of "constitutional facts"5 is its recognition that it can write law
all day long to no avail unless its abstractions can be brought to bear upon the
conduct of human affairs.
*Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. [Judge Craven is the author
of Bradley V. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973). Editors' Note.]
1. Green V. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968).
2. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
3. Nesbit v. Statesville City Bd. of Educ., 418 F.2d 1040, 1042 (4th Cir. 1969).
4. The late John M. Mull, Esquire, of Morganton, North Carolina, was forty-four years my
senior and my law partner.
5. Legislative facts are those which the court uses to develop law or policy. 2 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03 (1958). Constitutional facts are legislative facts that bear on
the constitutionality of governmental practices. P. BREST, PROCESS OF CONS TITUTIONAL
DECISION-MAKING (1974). For an example of a case turning on constitutional facts, see Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
IMPACT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
A facetious complaint among lawyers is that they sometimes have trouble
identifying the case they tried below as the one being described in the appellate
opinion. That this is even partly true illustrates what everyone knows: that
judges much more often disagree on the facts or the proper inferences to be
drawn from the facts than on the law.
To give a simplistic answer to a difficult question: the role that the social
sciences ought to play in the judicial decision-making process is, of course, the
same as the role of any other science, whether medical, electronic, or atomic. In
short, all sources of human information and knowledge properly contribute to
the determination of the facts.
From Lochner v. New York' to Roe v. Wade7 and Doe v. Bolton,8 there has
seemingly been little change in the doctrine of substantive due process. But the
facts have changed, or if they have not changed, the Court's awareness of the
facts has changed-which is to the same effect. From Nebbia v. New York9 until
the present, the Court has become increasingly suspicious of its own expertise
in economics and increasingly assured of its own competence in the social
science areas. And so there has been less and less protection of contract and
property interests and more and more protection of personal liberty, including
the discernment of rights that are not apparent on the face of the Con-
stitution.1 0 The Brandeis brief was an innovation in Muller v. Oregon"'i but is
now standard operating procedure in equal employment, ecology, and major
school desegregation cases. The problem is not whether to use the social sci-
ences, or whether it is proper to do so, but how to persuade the courts of the
truth of the ultimate facts asserted. Courts are comfortable with evidentiary
facts-how fast the car was being driven-and are uncomfortable with conclus-
ory facts-what caused the tire to blow out. One of the few reasons for wanting
to retain trial by jury in civil cases is that difficult questions such as negligence
can be left to the jury. Aided by the failure to sustain the burden of proof
standard, there is no question too hard for the jury to answer. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the courts are uneasy in the presence of the ultimate facts
or conclusions of the social sciences because we have many times consumed
large quantities of social science-from Dred Scott 2 to Lochner 13-only to have
to regurgitate it.
6. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
9. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
10. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Louis Brandeis filed a 113-page brief supporting Oregon's maximum
hour law for women, drawing upon foreign, federal, and state studies concerning women's reac-
tions to contemporary working conditions. The views of American, French, and German doctors
were cited by Brandeis as evidence that women could not tolerate the same working hours as did
men. Brie for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, id.
12. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1854).
13. Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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In the year 1856, William A. Smith, Doctor of Divinity and President of
Randolph Macon College, entered in the office of the clerk of the district court
for the middle district of Tennessee, a copy of his lectures that had been
delivered to the classes in moral science at Randolph Macon College for many
years. The lectures were entitled The Philosophy and Practice of Slavery and were
published by Stephenson & Owen, Nashville, Tennessee, in 1857, the same
year that Scott v. Sandford1 4 was decided by the United States Supreme Court. I
should think that Dr. Smith would have cheerfully admitted to being a social
scientist, and a distinguished one at that. The burden of his message to his
contemporaries, as stated in the first chapter, is that domestic slavery is not
sinful and that slavery, per se, is right; "or that the great abstract principle of
slavery is right, because it is a fundamental principle of the social state; and
that domestic slavery, as an institution, is fully justified by the condition and
circumstances (essential and relative) of the African race in this country, and
therefore equally right." 15
Chief Justice Taney's opinion does not mention Dr. Smith's book, but it is
easy to suppose that he may have read it or others like it. In deciding whether
Dred Scott was a citizen and entitled to bring a diversity of citizenship action in
a federal court, the Chief Justice displayed great interest in "the state of public
opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized
and enlightened portions of the world at the time . . . when the Constitution of
the United States was framed and adopted."1 6 The factual context within which
the Court decided the case was, with respect to the status of the Negro, stated
to be as follows:'
7
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in
social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and
lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and
treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit
could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the
civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as
well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open
to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and habitually
acted upon it in their private pursuits, as %%ell as in matters of public concern,
without doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.
Some forty years later Mr. Justice Brown concluded that the fourteenth
amendment "could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon
color."' 8 Writing for the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson,'" he depended heavily
14. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1854).
15. W. SMITH, THE PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE OF SLAVERY 11-12 (1857).
16. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407.
17. Id.
18. Plessy -. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
19. Id.
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upon consensus of public opinion with respect to race relations. He nailed
down apartheid for his time by reference to the established usages, customs,
and traditions of the people. 20 Rather happily he concluded that "if one race be
inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put
them upon the same plane. 12 ' Dr. Smith would have agreed.
But by 1954 the Court was no longer reading Dr. Smith nor was it im-
pressed by "the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v.
Ferguson. '22 In Brown v. Board of Education,"3 Chief Justice Warren and mem-
bers of his Court may have reached a new high in judicial intellectual honesty.
Gone is Mr. Justice Brown's sophistry that if enforced separation of the races
"stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority" it "is solely because the
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."'2 4 Supported only by a
compilation of psychological and sociological studies of the status of the Negro
in America, the Court flatly concluded that "separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal. '2 5 The decision was not addressed to lawyers but to the
people. Although startling at the time, the decision now rests upon a bedrock
of public opinion that school assignments and other legal distinctions based
upon race are denigrating to the minority ethnic group and are simply unfair.
After twenty years of more or less successful attempts to implement Brown, I
think it can be said that there is a general consensus that enforced separation of
any race or group from the mainstream of society stigmatizes those against
whom such coercive laws are directed. Beyond that there is little agreement
and much uncertainty.
Many an inferior court, overreading Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County,26 Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County,2" and Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education ,28 thought that the Court's dogma
mandated racial balance29 despite occasional cryptic disclaimers.3 0 What the
20. 163 U.S. at 550.
21. 163 U.S. at 552.
22. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
23. id.
24. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 551.
25. 347 U.S. at 495.
26. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
27. 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
28. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
29. See, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 325 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Va. 1971). In
Bradley, the district court approved the adoption of a Richmond metropolitan school plan where
97 per cent of the black students in the metropolitan area (the three jurisdictions included in the
metropolitan area being the City of Richmond, Chesterfield County, and Henrico County) would
attend schools with racial compositions in the range of 20-40 per cent black. The Fourth Circuit
reversed on the grounds that where each of the districts had achieved unitary school systems, it
was not within the district court's authority to order the consolidation of three separate political
subdivisions of the Commonwealth of Virginia. 462 F.2d 1058, 1069 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
30. In Swanm, the district court ordered the school system to establish a 71 to 29 per cent ratio
of whites to blacks in the city's schools. On appeal the Supreme Court clarified its position on racial
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Court said in Swann seemed to some not nearly so important as what it did in
Davis.3 1 One did not have to be stupid to have thought in 1970 that every class
in every grade in every school in every zone within a given district must be
integrated, and that integration meant the maximum possible amount of de-
segregation or mixing of the races. There was a time when members of my
court were so concerned with the attainment of mixing that we even considered
minimizing the apparent danger of white flight. I debated the question with my
late dear friend, Judge Sobeloff, in Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School District
No. 1,32 and until Milliken v. Bradley3 3 was decided on July 25, 1974, I would
have thought it a standoff. Brunson got us into sociology over our heads. After
acknowledging my own ignorance of sociology and educational theory, I
quoted Dr. Thomas F. Pettigrew of Harvard University that the optimum mix
was 30 per cent black to 70 per cent white.3 4 The same sociological input must
have influenced Judge McMillan in Swann, for he suggested that it would be
desirable if the school board assigned students on the basis of a 71/29 ratio of
white to black students. 3
5
In September, 1969, there were 2,408 black students and 256 white stu-
balance. "[T]he use made of mathematical ratios was no more than a starting point in the process
of shaping, rather than an inflexible requirement." 402 U.S. at 25. "If we were to read the holding
of the district court to require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree
of racial balance or mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged to
reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school in
every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole." 402
U.S. at 24.
31. The Fifth Circuit, in Davis, approved a desegregation plan which used a major north-south
highway as a dividing line between two school zones. On the east side of the highway lived 94 per
cent of the metropolitan area's Negro students. About 88 per cent of the students on the west side
of the highway were white. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the basis that every
effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of desegregation must be explored, including the
possibility of the use of bus transportation and split zoning. While not attacking the racial imbal-
ance itself, the Court did imply that a major highway was not to be a barrier to desegregation. See
Davis v. Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
32. 429 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1970). Because of the small number of whites in Clarendon County,
South Carolina, it was feared that unyielding compliance to arithmetical formulas to achieve racial
balance would drive whites to the parochial schools. "It will be ironic, and contrary to the spirit of
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, [citations omitted] if the result of the application of the
Brown constitutional principle in this case is simply to accomplish an all-black school system." 429
F.2d at 822 (Craven, Haynsworth & Bryan, JJ., concurring & dissenting).
On the other hand, while "white flight" was a factor which Judge Sobeloff regretted, he would
not attempt to overcome it by a less stringent application of the arithmetic of racial balance. "[Tjhe
road to integration is served neither by covert capitulation, nor by overt compromise, such as
adoption of a schedule of 'optimal mixing.'" 429 F.2d at 827 (Sobeloff, J., concurring).
33. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
34. 429 F.2d at 821.
35. 311 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D.N.C. 1970), referring to an earlier opinion in the same case,
300 F. Supp, 1358, 1372 (W.D.N.C. 1969). The earlier opinion indicated that Judge McMillan
relied not only on the testimony of experts for this "racial mix" but also on "inferences from the
Coleman Report that although mixing a few whites and a heavy majority of blacks retards the
whole group, nevertheless mixing a substantial majority of whites and a few blacks helps the blacks to,
advance without retarding the whites." 300 F. Supp. at 1372.
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dents enrolled in School District No. I of Clarendon County, South Carolina.3 6
Only one white pupil enrolled for the 1973-74 session;3 7 thus my fears about
white flight have been realized. If the silence of the majority and the dissent of
Mr. Justice Marshall in Milliken means that white flight can never be a relevant
factor in considering the appropriate remedy for dismantling a dual school
system,3 8 then Judge Sobeloff wins. But he would not be happy to know that
the schools of Clarendon County are all black (save one) nor to envision with
Mr. Justice Marshall the specter of all-black schools in Detroit. Certainly it
would seem that Mr. Justice Marshall correctly concludes that "...what deseg-
regation of the public schools is all about" is "... to insure that Negro and
white children in fact go to school together. ' 3 And it still seems to me that
some is better than none.
Over the past eight years I have observed on my monthly visits to Rich-
mond that it has increasingly become a black city. I said as much in Bradley v.
School Board of City of Richmond.4  And I added that "the root causes of concen-
tration of blacks in the inner cities of America are simply not known."41
Perhaps I should have added "by judges." It is true that Dr. Karl Taeuber, a
professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, cast most of the blame for
the concentration of blacks in Richmond on discriminatory housing policies.42
But even he admitted that perhaps 15 per cent of existing segregation is at-
tributable to income differentials, and he seemed to attach some weight to what
he called "attachments to a particular neighborhood" and "an observable ten-
dency for blacks who can afford better housing not to make, for various
reasons, the long jump to a suburban homesite, but rather to move to a
peripheral transitional area."4 The testimony of other social scientists-Dr.
Thomas Pettigrew, Dr. Martin E. Sloane, and Dr. Jeanne C. Biggar-were not
so precise.4 4 I share the belief of the experts that housing segregation policy
36. 429 F.2d at 820.
37. Counsel for the school board, at my request, obtained this information concerning Claren-
don School District No. I front the state superintendent of education. Letter ftrom D.W. Robinson,
Robinson & Pope, Columbia, South Carolina, to the author, Aug. 16, 1974.
38. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
39. Id. at 802.
40. 462 F.2d 1058, 1066 (4th Cir. 1972), affld b an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
41. Id.
42. Bradley %'. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 338 F. Supp. 67, 212 (E.D. Va. 1972).
43. 338 F. Supp. at 214. See Farley, Resdential Segregation and Its Implications jor School Integra-
tion, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 1, at 164 (1975). Professor Reynolds Farley analyzes studies of
data collected by Karl and Alma Taeuber and tle U.S. Census Bureau. The studies indicate that
racial segregation is a far greater factor than its economic counterpart as a determinant of residen-
tial segregation patterns. Farley notes that even those blacks who can afford to mve to the sub-
urbs are highly segregated from whites in those outlying areas. Other studies indicate that the vast
majority of blacks prefet integrated neighborhoods and schools. Id. at 174-77, 190. Citing dis-
criminatory housing policies (an "institutional web of discrimination") as the prime factor, Farley
concludes that economic factors do not fully explain neighborhood racial segregation patterns.
Id. at 191.
44. 338 F. Stipp. at 214-15.
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has been an important factor in the creation of the ghetto pattern in the
American cities. But I am unwilling to jump to the conclusion that it was the
only factor or even the dominant one. If it is so perfectly clear that restrictive
racial covenants and discriminatory housing policies created the ghetto,
whether in New York or Boston or Richmond, why is it that years after Shelley
v. Kraemer45 and reported changes in such policies, the ghettos remain virtually
intact?
Powell v. Texas46 is a good example of an idea whose time has not yet come.
Everyone now knows something about alcoholism, and there is emerging a
consensus of opinion that we ought not to put drunks in jail so long as they do
not harm other persons. Even so, the Court was uneasy with the "findings of
fact" below :
47
(1) That chronic alcoholism is a disease which destroys the afflicted
person's will power to resist the constant, excessive consumption of alcohol.
(2) That a chronic alcoholic does not appear in public by his own volition
but under a compulsion symptomatic of the disease of chronic alcoholism.
(3) That Leroy Powell, defendant herein, is a chronic alcoholic who is af-
flicted with the disease of chronic alcoholism.
The majority was unwilling to use these "findings" as the basis for a constitu-
tional holding that "a person may not be punished if the condition essential to
constitute the defined crime is part of the pattern of his disease and is oc-
casioned by a compulsion symptomatic of the disease." 48 Mr. Justice Marshall,
writing for a plurality of the Court, thought that the Court had too little
knowledge to support the announcement of an important and wide-ranging
new constitutional principle.
49
Just as a raconteur will seldom let the facts interfere with a good story,
judges seem to have seldom allowed sociology to interfere with a good
theory-until the time of the new idea has come. Sometimes it is a long time
coming; but when it arrives, it is then woven into the constitutional fabric.
45. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
46. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
47. Id. at 521.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 536-37.
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